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Abstract
This study examines the growth of global mobile telephony and the economic factors that affect this
growth. Mobile telephony has exhibited substantial growth in the decade to 2000 and this growth is
expected to continue with the introduction of technically advanced mobile cellular networks. A dynamic
demand model is estimated by using global telecommunications panel data comprised of 56 countries.
Results from the estimation are provided along with elasticity estimates and impulse response functions for
price and income.
r 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Amobile telephone network is comprised of the physical components required to connect users.
The basic physical components are the handset, base station and mobile service switching station
(MSC) (Gruber & Hoenicke, 1999). A call made from a handset is transmitted to a base station
and then to an MSC. An area that is serviced by this network is divided geographically into cells.
A cellular system can employ many small radio coverage areas to provide service (Foreman &
Beauvais, 1999). Since 1990 mobile telephone subscription has doubled globally every 20 months.
From an 11 million subscriber base and an average penetration of 1% at 1990, the mobile
telecommunications industry now supports a half billion subscribers (International Telecommu-
nication Union, ITU, 1999). The average global penetration at June 1999 was 27% (Gruber &
Valletti, 2003).
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Several institutional developments have had an impact on mobile telephony growth.1
Introduction of digital technology substantially relaxed the radio spectrum constraint.
Transmission rates increased from 0.33 bits/s/Hz to approximately 1.40 bits/s/Hz as TDMA
allowed more efﬁcient use of the radio spectrum (Gruber & Valletti, 2003). Digital technology
brought features for commercial mobile telecommunications not available with analogue
technology. In particular, digital technology permits data transmission, e.g., short message
service, e-mail and increased sound quality. Digital networks require lower power levels for
operation that results in lighter and smaller handsets (ITU, 1999). Second-generation (2G) mobile
systems operation have drawn on the experience of ﬁrst-generation (FG) mobile systems in the
realization of network effects and economies of scale. This has resulted in the creation of fewer
systems than for FG mobile.
The early mobile telephony industry was mostly monopoly operator supplied. Existing ﬁxed-
line operators initially provided mobile telephony as an extension or value-added service. In 1990
three-quarters of the 29 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
member countries with mobile telephony had a monopoly provider—by 2000 none had monopoly
providers. Duopoly providers serviced four countries, 11 had three operators, and 14 had more
than three mobile operators (Gruber & Valletti, 2003). Regulatory innovation in mobile telephony
markets concerns the timing and number of licenses granted, the method by which licenses are
granted and whether a technological standard is set (Gruber & Verboven, 2001). With
technological advances, the subscriber base that a network can support is increased, as is the
demand for mobile service.
Ultimately the number of licenses granted also grew. Additional licenses allowed for intensiﬁed
competition, which further fuelled diffusion. Gruber and Verboven suggest that the timing of ﬁrst
and second licenses might explain why diffusion occurred more rapidly in certain countries.
Reasons given for catch-up include economies of scale (infrastructure investment, including the
cost of mobile handsets, decreases through time), whereby average network set-up costs decline
with network size. Late adoption externalities may also arise due to learning spillovers. Entry of
mobile providers into former monopoly markets ensured the evolution of a more competitive
environment. Mobile operators developed tariff (pricing) packages in an attempt to differentiate
themselves from their competitors, isolate market segments and target customer groups and
geographic regions (ITU, 1999).2
The focus of this study is the analysis of economic drivers of market growth, viz., price, income
and network effects (endogenous) within this evolving institutional context. In particular, the
price of acquiring and using mobile telecommunications since its inception has declined. Further,
Jha and Majumdar (1999) ﬁnd that mobile telephony penetration has varied substantially among
countries according to their gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. They argue that greater
prosperity translates into an enhanced demand for mobile telecommunications service. Gruber
and Verboven (2001) ﬁnd no support for this case from within the OECD. Finally, Gruber and
Valletti (2003) argue that network effects in production are due to economies of scale equipment
supply and operation of networks, and that consumption externalities arise from subscribers’
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ability to roam.3 Network effects are larger in the presence of a common standard. Consumption
effects lead to self-propelling or endogenous growth. Such endogenous growth is particularly
important during the early adoption stage for new networks.
The literature concerning patterns of technology diffusion has mostly considered the
dominant stylized fact that adoption typically follows an S-shaped curve, i.e., diffusion rates
initially rise and then fall over time ultimately leading to market satiation (Geroski, 2000).
Many underlying motivations can generate S-shaped curves (see Parker, 1994). The estimation
of such models typically requires long time-series.4 This data requirement limits the
potential to provide projects on market growth early in the diffusion process, and also
ignores the problem of parameter variation in new product diffusion models (see Meade &
Islam, 1998; Putsis, 1998). The approach adopted here follows Madden and Coble-Neal (2001).
Rather than modelling the diffusion process per se they consider optimizing economic agent
behaviour directly. They assume that an individual’s instantaneous indirect utility of subscribing
to mobile telephony depends on income, price and current network size, where network size is the
number of current subscribers. An advantage of the approach is that it can be applied to
developing country penetration issues by using short time-series employing a pooled sample.
Pooled samples better enable the role of income in the diffusion process to be assessed in the
absence of long time-series.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the economic
factors that drive mobile subscription. In Section 3 a model to examine mobile telephony
network growth that incorporates a network effect is speciﬁed. Data and variables used in the
estimation are presented and described in Section 4. The empirical modelling strategy is explained
in Section 5, and estimates are reported. Concluding remarks and policy implications are provided
in Section 6.
2. Economic factors and mobile subscription
2.1. Mobile telephony pricing
In the early stages of mobile telephony diffusion, subscription was mostly business-related.
Prior to digital cellular technology there was no incentive for providers to lower their prices, as
they faced excess demand. High service and access prices de facto rationed the limited spectrum.
The introduction of digital technology allowed service provider entry into these monopoly
markets. This entry led to competition among operators for subscribers and resulted in lower
prices. Subsequent price reductions were used to expand an operator’s subscriber base—and were
the ﬁrst consumer-orientated tariff strategies. ITU (1999) World Development Report describes
current mobile pricing strategy as based on extensive market research and analysis of usage. For
instance, mobile telephone operators are now expanding the market by targeting late-adopter
groups.
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2.2. Gross domestic product
Jha and Majumdar (1999) expect GDP per capita to enhance mobile telephony diffusion. They
argue that greater GDP per capita signiﬁes greater affordability and so leads to increased demand
for mobile telecommunications service. Gruber and Verboven (2001) ﬁnd no empirical support for
this proposition; however, their ﬁnding may arise because of the relatively ‘narrow band’ of high-
income countries they examine. Further, the role of GDP in mobile telephony diffusion may not
be as clear as Jha and Majumdar (1999) propose; e.g., countries such as Cambodia have seen
mobile telephony subscription outstrip that of ﬁxed lines. Gruber (2001), however, ﬁnds no such
relationship for Central and Eastern Europe.
2.3. Network effects
New subscribers joining a network increase the utility of current subscribers. This process leads
to self-propelling or endogenous network growth, and suggests that current subscription is
positively inﬂuenced by previous subscription (Economides & Himmelberg, 1995). In particular,
little if any utility is gained from an individual subscribing to the network unless there are
sufﬁcient subscribers already using the service. However, the viability of a new network relies on
the spontaneous existence of an initial critical mass of subscribers. Intuitively, early adopters must
derive a high level of value from the good, even though it has limited use.
3. Theoretical model
The approach adopted here follows Madden and Coble-Neal (2001) who rather than modelling
the diffusion process per se consider optimizing economic agent behaviour directly. They let the
instantaneous utility of subscribing to mobile telephony for an individual with income Y and a
network of size N be given by uðY ; NÞ; where the size of a network is determined by the number of
subscribers.5 Assuming that network connection yields an inﬁnite stream of future utility, given an
expected future time path of network size NeðtÞ; the present value of the beneﬁts from network
subscription for a consumer with income Y is
V ðY ; t; NeðtÞÞ ¼
Z N
t
ersuðY ; neðsÞÞ ds; ð1Þ
where r is the discount rate. Suppose subscription is offered at time t at price PðtÞ: When
subscribed at t; the corresponding present value of access cost is
qðtÞ ¼ ertPðtÞ: ð2Þ
Consumers choose to subscribe at t to maximise
V ðY ; t; NeðtÞÞ  qðtÞ: ð3Þ
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Assuming (3) is concave over the relevant range, t is characterized by
uðY ; NeðtÞÞ ¼ rPðtÞ 
qPðtÞ
qt
 lðtÞ; ð4Þ
where lðtÞ is the opportunity cost of subscription. With utility speciﬁed Cobb–Douglas,
(4) translates to
uðYt; Net Þ ¼ AY
k
t N
eo
t ¼ lt ð5Þ
and implies an equilibrium network size
lnNet ¼ mþ a ln lt þ blnYt; ð6Þ
where m ¼ o1 lnA; a ln lt ¼ o1 ln lt and b lnYt ¼ o1 lnYt: Further, assuming that the
market does not instantaneously adjust to its long-run equilibrium and the expected network size
in equilibrium at t ðNet Þ is not observed, they follow Cabal and Leita (1992) by assuming that the
actual value of Nt results from a process of partial adjustment toward N
e
t ;
lnNt  lnNt1 ¼ gðlnNet  lnNt1Þ; ð7Þ
where the partial adjustment coefﬁcient is 0ogo1: Substitution of (6) into (7) yields the network
equilibrium correction model for estimation:
lnNt  lnNt1 ¼ gðmþ a ln lt þ b lnYt  lnNt1Þ ð8Þ
which after rearrangement becomes
DlnNt ¼ a0 þ a1 ln lt þ a2 lnYt  a3 lnNt1; ð9Þ
where DlnNt ¼ lnNt  lnNt1; a0 ¼ gm; a1 ¼ ga; a2 ¼ gb; and a3 ¼ g:
4. Data and variables
Annual data are required to estimate the model, and are collected for 56 countries for 1995–
2000 from the ITU (2002) World Telecommunications Indicators Database. These data are
comprised of GDP, mobile telephone subscription, monthly mobile telephone subscription charge,
and population. Countries represented include 8 Low, 11 Lower-Middle, 9 Upper-Middle and 28
High income nations from Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and the Western Hemisphere.
GDP is denominated in Special Drawing Rights (SDR) to offset the rapid appreciation in the
USD during the mid- to late-1990s and deﬂated by the consumer price index (CPI) (1995 ¼ 100).
CPI is obtained from the World Bank (2002) World Development Indicators Database. Deﬂated
GDP series are divided by population to provide per capita INCOME series. Cellular mobile
telephone subscribers per 100 inhabitants (SUBSCRIBERS) comprise analogue and digital users
(CDMA, DAMPS, GSM, PCS and PHS systems). PRICE is constructed by using the cellular
monthly subscription charge denominated in SDR and deﬂated by the CPI index. Missing data
for OECD member countries are sourced from the OECD Communication Outlook (OECD,
1997, 1999, 2001). The remaining missing observation for the US (1997) is obtained from the
Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association’s Semi Annual Mobile Telephone Survey
(2000). Other data are detailed in the appendix.
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Figs. 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship of SUBSCRIBERS versus INCOME and PRICE.
Indicated pair-wise correlations reveal expected relationships between SUBSCRIBERS and the
explanatory variables INCOME and PRICE. Also evident is the high degree of variation by
country, particularly for PRICE. Capello (1994) argues that the limited PRICE inﬂuence is
symptomatic of early adoption where endogenous network growth dominates the PRICE effect.
Three outliers in the upper-left segment of Fig. 1 correspond to Korea, Portugal and Taiwan.
5. Model estimation
The estimation strategy employed for (9) is as follows. Eq. (9) corresponds to the Pooled model
that assumes mobile telephone demand is identical across countries. Variation in demand by
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Fig. 1. Mobile subscriber and income, 1995–2000. Note. Observations are six-year averages for each country.
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Fig. 2. Mobile subscriber and price, 1995–2000. Note. Observations are six-year averages for each country.
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country requires that (9) be modiﬁed. The alternative speciﬁcations considered are the one-way
Fixed-Effect (FEM) and Random-Effect (REM) models. The FEM allows intercepts to vary by
country at a point in time, and is depicted by
D Log ðSUBSCRIBERSÞit
¼ ai0 þ a1 Log ðINCOMEÞit þ a2 LogðPRICEÞit
 a3 LogðSUBSCRIBERSÞit1 þ eit; ð10Þ
where subscript i ¼ f1; 2; 3;y; 56g is country-speciﬁc. The REM model speciﬁcation considers
country variation to be randomly distributed and uncorrelated with explanatory variables; the
result is a complex disturbance term
eit ¼ ai0 þ uit; ð11Þ
and nit is a white-noise error process with zero mean and constant variance.
Table 1 reports the ﬁnal results of the estimation of (10), which is conducted in stages.6 In Stage
1, the null hypothesis of no country-speciﬁc intercepts (or a10 ¼ a20 ¼ a30 ¼? ¼ ai0) is tested by
using the Pooled model. Rejection leads to choice between FEM and REM speciﬁcations.
A Hausman (1978) test of the correlation between the error and the regressors is used to check
whether the REM is appropriate. A test of the signiﬁcance of group effects rejects the Pooled
model. Hausman’s (1978) test rejects the null that the REM estimator is efﬁcient. The
appropriateness of the FEM over the REM supports the use of dummy variables to control for
country-speciﬁc effects or differences in the cross-country demand for mobile telephony. Finally,
since a number of studies (e.g. Perl, 1983; Ahn & Lee, 1999) have reported signiﬁcant non-linear
income effects, tests for non-linear income terms are conducted. Second-order income terms are
found to be statistically insigniﬁcant. However, re-estimating (10) across the high-income
countries results in substantially smaller coefﬁcients. Finally, reported t-statistics indicate
INCOME, PRICE and SUBSCRIBER1 are all signiﬁcant.
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Table 1
Global mobile telephone demand elasticities
Variable Global High-income countries
Coefﬁcient t-statistic Elasticity Parameter t-statistic Elasticity
Constant
Income 1.57 3.83 4.76 0.52 2.09 3.47
Price 0.18 2.60 0.55 0.08 1.83 0.53
Subscribers1 0.33 10.45 0.15 5.32
%R2 0.42 0.51
Note. The Hausman (1978) test rejects the REM speciﬁcation. All coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
Parameter refers to the identiﬁed structural parameters derived from the estimated coefﬁcients.
6The two-stage instrumental variables technique is used for all models. In the ﬁrst step, total mobile subscribers is
regressed on current and previous period ﬁxed-line prices and ﬁxed-line subscribers, along with the previous period’s
mobile price, and mobile subscribers are used and a time index. Tests of homoescedasticity are rejected in the FEM and
pooled models. Therefore, generalized least squares is applied in estimation.
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The calculated PRICE and INCOME variables elasticities’ are also presented. The identiﬁed
income elasticities are large and imply, for the global model, that a percent increase in income
yields close to 4.8% increase in mobile subscription growth. Income elasticity for high-income
countries is 27% less than the global model, but is also highly elastic. Large income elasticities
provide an indication that subscribers place high value on mobile telephony. Price elasticities for
both models are inelastic and close in magnitude. Hence, price reductions will yield the same
response in subscription growth, irrespective of location. The identiﬁed subscriber parameters
(network effect) are 0.33 and 0.15 for global and high-income countries, respectively. This implies
that for the global model, a 1% increase in subscribers yields an average 0.33% increase in
network subscription growth. The network effect for high-income countries is approximately half
of the global model. Given the higher penetration rates for high-income countries, the results
indicate that the network effect is also non-linear. The effect appears to decrease with an
increasing subscriber base, with the marginal effect least in high-income countries where upper
critical mass is achieved. Nevertheless, the INCOME and SUBSCRIBER estimates show that
rising GDP and subscription positively affects network size.
5.1. Impulse response function
The plot of an impulse response function for PRICE and INCOME is provided by Fig. 3, and
visually depicts the behaviour of the SUBSCRIBERSit series in response to INCOME and PRICE
shocks (Enders, 1995). The impulse response function for an INCOME shock is
q SUBSCRIBERStþi
q INCOMEt
¼ bgð1þ ð1 gÞ þ ð1 gÞ2
þ ð1 gÞ3 þ?þ ð1 gÞiÞ; ð12Þ
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where q SUBSCRIBERtþi=q INCOMEt is the change in network size resulting from a unit
INCOME shock at t: b is the estimated INCOME coefﬁcient, g is the network externality, and i is
the number of countries. The corresponding impulse response function for a unit PRICE shock at
t is
q SUBSCRIBERtþi
q PRICEt
¼ agð1þ ð1 gÞ þ ð1 gÞ2
þ ð1 gÞ3 þ?þ ð1 gÞiÞ: ð13Þ
Plots of shocks (12) and (13) are contained in Fig. 3. Changes in INCOME are shown to have a
more substantial effect on SUBSCRIBERS in successive periods. Indeed, for the global model,
the cumulative impact of a percent change in income is 8.6 times larger than the price effect.
6. Conclusion
Global mobile telephony markets have achieved substantial growth since their inception. Since
1990, from a base of 11 million the market has grown to over half a billion subscribers. Average
global penetration at June 1999 was 27%. Advances in mobile technology from FG to 2G (and
eventually 3G) have relaxed the spectrum constraint. Innovations in regulation have enabled entry
of competitive operators into these former monopoly markets. The sum of these effects has seen
declining mobile telephony prices, apparently further expanding the market to attract marginal
users. The purpose of this study is to model this exponential network growth in terms of economic
drivers of income, price and network externalities, without directly considering these institutional
changes in individual markets.
Because only short time-series are available, the modelling framework adopted is explicit utility
maximisation. The resulting econometric model is amenable to panel data estimation. Toward
this end, data are collected from ITU, UN, World Bank and IMF sources to construct national
income, mobile telephony pricing and mobile subscription series (1995–2000) for 56 nations
classiﬁed by GNP level. Panel data estimation of mobile subscription controls for cross-country
heterogeneity. In particular, a pooled cross-section, time-series model, FEM and REM are
estimated from the panel data set by using OLS and GLS estimation techniques. The FEM is
preferred, and suggests that GDP and the network externality effect are important in explaining
network growth. Low-income countries are more income-elastic. Network effects are inelastic, but
nevertheless provide an important explanation for the rapid growth in mobile telephony.
Moreover, both the income and network effects exhibit signs of non-linearity, with the marginal
effects reducing as subscription growth increases. Finally, price is shown to have a uniform effect
across the two models and is inelastic. While price is clearly important, the impulse response
functions highlight that increases in income will yield a cumulative subscription effect 8.6 times
larger than the equivalent change in price.
However, to take comfort in this tentative conclusion requires that better pricing data, which
take account of both subscription and use, be employed. That is, the mobile telephony pricing
data used here are for cellular monthly subscription only. A more complete pricing series would
encompass both cellular connection charges and usage-sensitive pricing. Another aspect of pricing
that needs addressing in future studies is the impact of prepaid telephony cards. This form of
ARTICLE IN PRESS
G. Madden et al. / Telecommunications Policy 28 (2004) 133–144 141
mobile telephony usage-sensitive pricing is particularly important for young users in developed
economies, and more generally in developing economies.
Acknowledgements
We thank Inho Chung, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the Evolution of
Mobile Services—National and International Session presentation at the 14th Biennial
Conference of the International Telecommunications Society, Seoul, Korea, August 2002. The
authors are also grateful to Yoel Finkel of the Central Bureau of Statistics Israel, Laszlo Kasa of
the Communication Authority of Hungary, Elsa Neira De Uribe, Colombian Institute for the
Development of Science and Technology, Bernadette Finn at Teligen, John Ure of the University
of Hong Kong and the staff at ChinaNex.com for valuable assistance on data sources. The usual
disclaimer applies.
Appendix
The primary data source is the International Telecommunication Union World Telecommu-
nication Indicators 2002 database. Missing data are sourced as follows.
A.1. Consumer price index
Central African Republic (2000) is sourced from the World Bank web site (http://
www.worldbank.org/data/). Values for China (1996–2000) are from the International Financial
Statistics Yearbook 2001, p. 355. Nicaragua (2000) is available from the International Monetary
Fund Statistical Appendix (http://www.imf.org/). Sudan (2000) is sourced from the Republic of
the Sudan Ministry of Foreign affairs (http://www.sudmer.com).
A.2. Cellular monthly subscription price
OECD mobile telecommunications data used are the annual ﬁxed price component converted
to monthly. These data correspond to Canada (1996), Denmark and France (2000), Italy (1996,
1998, 2000), Netherlands (2000), Spain (1998, 2000), Sweden (1998, 2000), United States (1996,
1998 and 2000). Interpolated data points are Belgium, Canada, Italy and the United States (1997).
The data for Colombia (2000) were located at http://www.asocel.org.co/. Initial (1995) PRICE
data for Burkina Faso, the Sudan and Togo are missing because there were zero mobile
subscribers. In order to calculate meaningful PRICE points to correspond to zero subscribers, the
intercept price was calculated from a linear extrapolation from the line of best ﬁt, in effect creating
a virtual price. Interpolated data points are Cambodia (1998), Nicaragua (2000), Pakistan (1996,
1998), Viet Nam (1997, 1998), Tunisia (2000). Data for Hungary (2000) were located at http://
www.westel900.net/dijcsomagok/alapszolgaltatas e.html. PRICE is a simple average of market
leader Westel’s Eurofon I, Eurofon II, Eurofon III and MobilMester packages as of 29 February
2000. Missing data point for Israel (2000) is kindly provided in index form by the Central Bureau
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of Statistics. Annual index numbers converted to growth rates and the growth factor for 1999–
2000 are multiplied by the 1999 ITU price to yield a currency-based measure. An average monthly
mobile subscription price for Nicaragua at 2000 was interpolated from the 2002 value. This 2002
value was sourced from the National Nicaraguan Telecommunications Regulatory website at
http://www.telcor.gob.ni/. This average value for 2002 was $417.97 (local currency unit) and did
not include the ‘extra’ plans. Poland (1997, 1998 and 1999) was sourced from Teligen. Monthly
rental is the arithmetic average of subscription rates for pricing plans: Halo, White, Simply, Blue,
Navy-Blue and VIP.
A.3. Gross domestic product
Values corresponding to Cambodia, Central African Republic, Fiji, Japan and Kenya (2000)
are sourced from the World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank. Values for Sudan (1998,
1999, 2000) are from World Development Indictors 2002, World Bank.
A.4. Residential monthly telephone subscription price
Ireland, Netherlands, and Sweden (2000) are sourced in Communications Outlook 2001, OECD,
from Table 7.18, p. 204. Canada and Sweden (1998) are sourced from Communications Outlook
1999, OECD, Table 7.22, p. 190. Missing observations for China (1995, 1996) were sourced
directly from staff at ChinaNex.com. Columbia (2000) was sourced from Colciencias, Colombian
Institute for the Development of Science and Technology. The year 2000 residential monthly ﬁxed
line subscription price was taken directly from the National Nicaraguan Telecommunications
Regulatory website at http://www.telcor.gob.ni/. It is deﬁned there as the basic residential
subscription price and is quoted in the local currency unit. Further, it states on this website that
this tariff maintains its value in relation to the US dollar as of the 10th of June 2000.
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